The fighting between the Russian Federation and Ukraine drags on, taking a terrible toll on both countries. It has already wreaked havoc for over a thousand days. Though hopes for peace rose after Trump took office, recent diplomatic gaffes have sent them plummeting. Rather than ending, the conflict now seems more likely to continue and even escalate.
Russia and Ukraine will end the war when they want to, on their own terms. The problem is not that the parties want to keep fighting—both doubtless want the war to end, albeit subject to certain terms. The problem is getting them to take the first step away from conflict and toward agreement.
History holds a secret for getting even the most bitterly opposed enemies to stop making war and start making peace. It saw early use in the Jay Treaty of 1794. Even after the American War for Independence officially ended, unresolved disputes about territorial borders, unpaid debts, and seizures of property continued to fester between the United States and Great Britain, poisoning their relations.
Faced with seemingly intractable disagreements and without any mutually trusted intermediary to decide their disputes, the two sovereigns struck on a way to build peace on the smallest possible agreement. The Jay Treaty did not itself settle the parties’ disputes. It instead delegated that task to arbitrators. The treaty did not pretend to name mutually agreeable arbitrators, either. Instead, the United States and Great Britain agreed that each would appoint a few arbitrators, who would then among themselves choose other arbitrators. Together, the arbitrators formed three commissions–one for territorial disputes, one for debts, and one for property seizures–and empowered them to issue final and binding opinions.
In this way, through direct and derivative consent, the United States and Great Britain created an ad hoc institution that each could trust to decide their dispute. The Jay Treaty not only delivered the final resolution of a long-running conflict. It also laid the foundations for what would, after the War of 1812 and a few more hiccups, grow into a special relationship characterized by mutual respect and good will. Following the example set by the Jay Treaty, many other international disputes have been resolved the same way.
The secret to the Jay Treaty’s success? Instead of trying to force the United States and Great Britain into a standing court, the authority of which both were unlikely to agree on, the Jay Treaty let each choose its own arbitrators. From that small start, a whole system for resolving their disputes could be built.
Russia and Ukraine might likewise find peace using the Jay Treaty’s approach. Consider how much their conflict resembles the American War for Independence: In both, an ancient and powerful nation ruled a globe-spanning empire with a large and experienced military force. In both, a scrappy frontier upstart fought off its former master, counting on home field advantage, capable allies, and sheer determination to secure victory. Despite their common origins, similar cultures, and long ties of commerce and kinship, the countries grew to hate each other as only estranged family members can. Attempts at dialog went nowhere. Deadly conflict erupted.
The Jay Treaty brought just and lasting peace between the United States and Great Britain. It was able to do so much for them because it asked so little from them. The Jay Treaty asked the disputants merely to start a process leading to the appointment of arbitrators qualified to decide their disputes fairly and finally. Russia and Ukraine might likewise agree to take that, the smallest of steps toward peace.
A new Treaty of Peace and Reconciliation would ask little more of Russia and Ukraine than that they pause their fighting and choose their arbitrators. Precedents such as the Free City of Danzig, administered by the League of Nations from 1920–39 and the Free Territory of Trieste, administered by the United Nations from 1947–54, demonstrate how the parties can temporarily administer demilitarized areas pending resolution of disputes over their sovereignty.
Russia and Ukraine cannot continue fighting forever. Somehow or other, sooner or later, peace will come. Recent events offer little hope for reconciliation, granted. A wider view of history, however, reveals how the smallest of agreements can lead to the greatest of victories: The victory of peace over war.
The fighting between the Russian Federation and Ukraine drags on, taking a terrible toll on both countries. It has already wreaked havoc for over a thousand days. Though hopes for peace rose after Trump took office, recent diplomatic gaffes have sent them plummeting. Rather than ending, the conflict now seems more likely to continue and even escalate.
Russia and Ukraine will end the war when they want to, on their own terms. The problem is not that the parties want to keep fighting — both doubtless want the war to end, albeit subject to certain terms. The problem is getting them to take the first step away from conflict and toward agreement.
History holds a secret for getting even the most bitterly opposed enemies to stop making war and start making peace. It saw early use in the Jay Treaty of 1794. Even after the American War for Independence officially ended, unresolved disputes about territorial borders, unpaid debts and seizures of property continued to fester between the United States and Great Britain, poisoning their relations.
Faced with seemingly intractable disagreements and without any mutually trusted intermediary to decide their disputes, the two sovereigns struck on a way to build peace on the smallest possible agreement. The Jay Treaty did not itself settle the parties’ disputes. It instead delegated that task to arbitrators. The treaty did not pretend to name mutually agreeable arbitrators, either. Instead, the United States and Great Britain agreed that each would appoint a few arbitrators, who would then among themselves choose other arbitrators. Together, the arbitrators formed three commissions–one for territorial disputes, one for debts, and one for property seizures–and empowered them to issue final and binding opinions.
In this way, through direct and derivative consent, the United States and Great Britain created an ad hoc institution that each could trust to decide their dispute. The Jay Treaty not only delivered the final resolution of a long-running conflict. It also laid the foundations for what would, after the War of 1812 and a few more hiccups, grow into a special relationship characterized by mutual respect and good will. Following the example set by the Jay Treaty, many other international disputes have been resolved the same way.
The secret to the Jay Treaty’s success? Instead of trying to force the United States and Great Britain into a standing court, the authority of which both were unlikely to agree on, the Jay Treaty let each choose its own arbitrators. From that small start, a whole system for resolving their disputes could be built.
Russia and Ukraine might likewise find peace using the Jay Treaty’s approach. Consider how much their conflict resembles the American War for Independence: In both, an ancient and powerful nation ruled a globe-spanning empire with a large and experienced military force. In both, a scrappy frontier upstart fought off its former master, counting on home field advantage, capable allies, and sheer determination to secure victory. Despite their common origins, similar cultures, and long ties of commerce and kinship, the countries grew to hate each other as only estranged family members can. Attempts at dialog went nowhere. Deadly conflict erupted.
The Jay Treaty brought just and lasting peace between the United States and Great Britain. It was able to do so much for them because it asked so little from them. The Jay Treaty asked the disputants merely to start a process leading to the appointment of arbitrators qualified to decide their disputes fairly and finally. Russia and Ukraine might likewise agree to take that, the smallest of steps toward peace.
A new Treaty of Peace and Reconciliation would ask little more of Russia and Ukraine than that they pause their fighting and choose their arbitrators. Precedents such as the Free City of Danzig, administered by the League of Nations from 1920–39 and the Free Territory of Trieste, administered by the United Nations from 1947–54, demonstrate how the parties can temporarily administer demilitarized areas pending resolution of disputes over their sovereignty.
Russia and Ukraine cannot continue fighting forever. Somehow or other, sooner or later, peace will come. Recent events offer little hope for reconciliation, granted. A wider view of history, however, reveals how the smallest of agreements can lead to the greatest of victories: The victory of peace over war.
Tom W. Bell is a professor at Chapman University Fowler School of Law and author of “The Special International Peace Zone: From History, Through Practice, Toward an End to Armed Conflict in Ukraine.”
